A stochastic differential game theory modeling and analyzing for Multi-Local-Worlds graph directed  by Zheng, Xiaojing
Systems Engineering Procedia 4 (2012) 259 – 267
2211-3819 © 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and peer-review under responsibility of Desheng Dash Wu.
doi:10.1016/j.sepro.2011.11.074
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com Systems 
Engineering 
Procedia
Systems Engineering Procedia 00 (2011) 000–000
www.elsevier.com/locate/procedia
The 2nd
A stochastic differential game theory modeling and analyzing 
for Multi-Local-Worlds graph directed
International Conference on Complexity Science & Information Engineering
Xiaojing Zhenga,ba*
aWuhan University, Luojia mountain, Wuhan, 430072, China
b
Abstract
Harbin University of Commerce, No.1, Xuehai Street, Harbin, 150028, China
Separating the management system into several Local-Worlds, the multi-players cooperation game and non-
cooperation game in a graph are constructed to describe the interaction between agents in a certain Local-World and 
between different Local-Worlds respectively. Furthermore, the corresponding analytic processes that consist of two 
different game theory models are specified, then the profits, the optimal decision of agent, in this system with 
cooperative stochastic differential game model between Agents and non-cooperative stochastic differential game 
model between Super-Agents considered simultaneously, are given.
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1. Introduction
Recently, there has been much interest in developing and studying new complex adaptive system that 
capture certain observed common features of inter-acting between agents in the system, which lets us 
understanding these systems more accurately. As we well know, these agents in the system should be 
divided to be certain relational different Locals that are independent with each other, and the interactivity
mechanism between agents can be separated into two categories: cooperative one and non-cooperative 
one, the former will be happened between agents in different Locals, and the latter will be happened 
between agents in the same Local. In a transitory time-dimension, the system configuration is a certain 
one, however, it will be changed with environment and system properties developing, which is described 
as follows.
Definition 1
0
( , , ) ( , , , ( ) )t t TS X
β
βπ +∈ ∈= ≡ Ω G A F P is called the game model in Multi-Local-Worlds 
graph. If
(1) Topological space G denotes the interaction configuration of the system, which is the set of graphs 
1 2( , ,..., )pC C C C= , 1 2 ( )( , ,..., )ii i i ir tC C C C= . Where iC , 1 i p≤ ≤ , as be called Super-Agent, is the first order 
segmentation of the system, ,1 ( )ij iC j r t≤ ≤ , which is called Agent, is the second order segmentation of 
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the system. A is the strategies space, which describes all behaviors perhaps happened in this system. π
is the payoff corresponding to certain Agents.
(2)
0
( )t t TX X
β β
∈= is a family of Ω -valued random variables, indexed by a discrete time parameter t
and a noise parameter β . F is a σ algebra, and : [0,1]→FP a probability measure.
(3) A realization { }tX
β = G defines an action α and a graph C .
(4) The interaction law of agents can be proposed based on following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1 As for arbitrary agent 
ji , its objectivity can be described as
{ }0
0 0 0
[ , ( ), ( )]exp ( ) exp ( ) ( ( ))j j
j j j
T s Ti i
t i i it t t
E g s x s u s r y dy ds r y dy q x T   − + −      ∫ ∫ ∫
The state dynamics of the ijth
0
0( ) [ , ( ), ( )], ( )jj j j j j
i
i i i i ix s f s x s u s x t x= =
agent is characterized by the set of vector-valued differential equations
, for {1,2,..., }
ij r i
i i N∈ ≡
where, ( ) i j
j j
m
i ix s X R∈ ⊂ denote the system statue of agent ji , jj
i
iu U∈ ⊂ i
lcompR is the control 
vector of agent
ji ,
0
exp ( )
s
t
r y dy −  ∫
is the discount factor, ( ( ))j
j
i
iq x T is the terminal payoff. In particular, 
[ , ( ), ( )]j
j j
i
i ig s x s u s and ( )
jiq x are positively related to 
ji
x , reflecting the earning potent of the resources.
[ , ( )]
j ji i
s x sσ is a 
j ji i
m ×Θ and ( )
ji
z s is a Θ -dimensional Wiener process and the initial state 0
ji
x is given. 
Let [ , ( )] [ , ( )] [ , ( )]
j j j j j j
T
i i i i i is x s s x s s x sσ σΩ = denote the covariance matrix with its element in row jih and 
the column 
ji
ς denote by [ , ( )]
j j
h
i is x s
ςΩ . For ,
j kj k i i
i i x x φ≠ ∩ = , and ( )
ji
z s and ( )
ki
z s are independent 
Wiener processes.
Hypothesis 2 There are several different Local-Worlds, which is large enough to contain certain 
number of agents interacting with the others, in complex adaptive system, on the contrary, which is small 
enough such that there exists several Local-Worlds interacting with the others in this system.
Hypothesis 3 In a short time-scale, each agent who stands on a certain Local-World interacts with the 
others, due to the mechanism of cooperative game, which means that all agents pursue to the maximized 
profit of the coalition of the Local-World, then distribute the system profit to every agent to make every 
agent’s profit gotten rationally and fairly; Each Local-World should interact with the others according to 
the mechanism of non-cooperative game. In a long time-scale, the behaviors and resources can be 
converged into a certain attractor with agents interacting, then system’s criticality is produced and the new 
topological configuration of agents’ interaction is formed, in this sense, the complex adaptive system is 
evolved.
Noted that, this definition is based on the research results of Béla Bollobás e.t. (2008), Eric Smith e.t.
(2011), Barton e.t. (2009), and so on. From description above we can see, the interactions between Super-
agents can be defined to the form of non-cooperative stochastic differential game ( , , )s x uΓ , the 
corresponding payoff can be denoted by ( , , )V s x u , which has been studied by Ramachandran (20006), 
Simon e.t. (2010); however, the behaviors between agents in a same Local-World can be expressed to the 
cooperative stochastic differential game, the first step for this problem is to simplify it to be the optimal 
problem ( , , )i is x uϖ , which is one of the most important to finish profit imputation between agents, the 
corresponding optimal payoff for this Super-agent can be denoted by ( , , )i iW s x u , which has been studied 
by Terry L. Friesz (2010), Yi-xiao LI e.t. (2008). However, these conclusions are lack of analyzing of 
time-varied of the system, which makes the results obtained be improved. Furthermore, whether the ith
( , , )s x uΓelement of Nash equilibrium solution of , ( , , )V s x u , is identified to the optimal solution of 
( , , )i is x uϖ , ( , , )i iW s x u , or there exist a certain relation between them, should be one of the most serious 
problem resolved, which will be specified in this paper. According to the conclusions of Chen Guanya 
(2009), Gerhard Stock e.t. (2009), Eberhard Zeidler (1984) and Dshalalow e.t. (2008), Nash equilibrium 
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solution ( , , )V s x u can be interchanged with the optimal solution ( , , )i iW s x u by introducing variational 
methods. Then, a profit imputation in arbitrary Super-Agent is constructed to satisfy the cooperative 
stochastic differential game in this Local-World, and to make the Local-World synchronized. However, 
the profit obtained of arbitrary agent is decided according to the transitory information about Global and 
Local-World that is an ideal case and can not be realized, and can be compensated by constructing a 
transitory compensatory mechanism, which will be specified in this paper too. This analysis is main 
contribution of this paper.
2. Main results
There are two things that need to care, the first one is the optimal profit of the complex adaptive system, 
and the other is how the optimal profit of every agent in arbitrary Local-World would be distributed to 
make the complex adaptive system keep the continuous and stronger competitive and more creative one.
Revoke the model mentioned above, we can see: (1) not only the transitory profit of the system can be 
considered, but also the profit maximized in a relative long time-scale, which means when there exists 
certain conflicts different between long-term objectivity and short-term objectivity, and which means this 
system is an intelligent one. (2) every agent’s decision relies on the system dynamics that relies on the 
state of the complex adaptive system and its evolution, which means the system has the property of the 
adaptive. (3) when every agent decide, not only the initial states of the system would be considered, but 
also the arbitrary state happened perhaps; however, the agents must decide based on the future state 
forecasted, which is not precise, so, there must be some compensation mechanism to revise their behavior, 
which make the system have the property of autonomous. These conclusions should be described as 
follows:
2.1. Agent’s profit
When the system is equilibrated, each agent in different Local-Worlds is different, so, the 
corresponding transitory profit can be described as Theorem 1.
Theorem 1    Agent’s profit in this complex system is written to
0
00
( ) *
( ) \( ) * *
0 0 \
( , )
( 1)!( )! exp[ ( )] ( , ) exp[ ( )] ( , )
!
j
i
i ji
i i j
i i
t i t
N
t K it K t q t qi i i
K K i
K N i
v t x
k n k r s t W t x r s t W t x
n⊆
=
− −  − − − ∑
, for * *
i i
t t
N Nx X∈ .
Where, W is the optimal profit, which is specified in Theorem 3, and q is a positive constant than small 
or equal to 1.
However, the payoff of Agent ji obtained relies on a transitory time t , but not the arbitrarily time 
[ , ]t Tτ ∈ , furthermore, several information cannot be known immediately, so, certain payment of 
transitory compensation must be introduced to escape decide incorrectly.
2.2. A payment of transitory compensation to arbitrary Agent i
Theorem 2    A payment of transitory compensation to player j ii N∈ at time 0[ , ]t Tτ ∈ equaling
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{
( )* *
0
( ) \( ) * *
( ) \( ) ( )* * * *
\
( 1)!( )!( ) [exp[ ( )]
!
( , ) ( , )
( , ) ( , ) , , ( , )
1
2
j
i i
i ji
i i
i ji i i
i i j i j iN Ni i
i i i
i
K N i
qq K iK
t K t t K t
q q
K iK N N
K t K i t N i Nx x
k n kr s t
n
W t x W t x
W t x W t x f x xτ τ
ττ τ τ
τ τ
ττ ττ τ τ τ
τ τ
τ
τ ψ τ
⊆
= =
= =
− −
= − −
   − +   
     −        
+
∑B
( )* *
, 1
( ) \* *
\
, 1
( , ) ( , )
1 ( , ) ( , )
2
i
i i i
hi ii t t
i i
i
i ji i
hi ii j t t
i i
qn
h K
K t tx x
h
n qK ih
K i t tx x
h
x W t x
x W t x
ζ
ζ
ζ τ
τ τ
ζ
τζ
τ τ
ζ
τ
τ
=
=
=
=
 Ω  
 − Ω   
∑
∑
when * *( )
i i iN N N
x x Xτ ττ = ∈ will lead to the realization of the Condition 1. Considering the partial derivate 
of ( ) *( , )i
i
K
KW x
τ ττ with respect to 
ji
x , where j ii K∉ , will vanish, a more concise form of the payment of 
transitory compensation to player j ii N∈ at time 0[ , ]t Tτ ∈ can be expressed as:
{
*
*
0
( ) \( ) * *
( ) ( )* * *
( ) \ *
\
( 1)!( )!( ) [exp[ ( )]
!
( , ) ( , )
( , ) , , ( , )
( , )
j
i i
i ji
i i
i i i
i j i j ii j
j i
i j
i jhi
i i i
i
K N i
qq K iK
t K t t K t
q
K N N
K t i N i Nx
i K
K i
K i tx
k n kr s t
n
W t x W t x
W t x f x x
W x
τ
τ
ττ τ τ
τ τ
τ ττ τ τ
τ
τ τ
τ
τ
τ ψ τ
τ
⊆
= =
=
∈
=
− −
= − −
   −   
   +    
−

∑
∑
B
( )* *
\
( )* *
, 1
( ) \* *
\
, 1
, , ( , )
1 ( , ) ( , )
2
1 ( , ) ( , )
2
i i
i i i i
i i j
i
i i i
hi ii t t
i i
i
i ji i
hi ii j t t
i i
q
N N
h N h N
h K i
qn
h K
K t tx x
h
n qK ih
K i t tx x
h
f x x
x W t x
x W t x
ζ
ζ
ττ τ
ζ τ
τ τ
ζ
τζ
τ τ
ζ
τ ψ τ
τ
τ
∈
=
=
=
=
   +  
 Ω  
 − Ω   
∑
∑
∑
where ( , )W s ⋅ is the optimal solution of each Agent in the sub-system, 0 1q< ≤ , 1q = if and only if the 
game is  Γ is infinite-horizon feedback game, otherwise, 1q < .
By Theorem 1 and Theorem 2, the agent’s profit, when the system is equilibrated, will be determined.
3. The cooperative-non-cooperative stochastic differential game in the system
Mentioned above, the system is separated into several different Local-Worlds, each of which is called 
Super-Agent, and every Local-World has several Agent. According to the property of the system, the 
interaction between Super-Agents should be constructed to a non-cooperative stochastic different game 
model, which describes the system equilibrated by competing with the other Local-Worlds. Similar, the 
interaction between Agents can be constructed to a cooperative stochastic different game model, which 
describe the agents in a same Local-World pursue to the common profits by cooperating together. The 
characters about these two different behaviors are specified as follows.
3.1. Cooperative stochastic differential game between agent in Local-Worlds
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Revoke the cooperative stochastic differential game 
cΓ in Local-World that labeled with i , as for 
every 
j ii K∈ = 1 2 1 2{ , ,..., } { , ,..., }ik r ii i i i i i N⊂ = , we have
0
0 0 0
[ , ( ), ( )]exp ( ) exp ( ) ( ( )) ,
{1,2,..., }
j j
j j j
j i j i
T s Ti i
t i i it t t
i K i K
j i k i
E g s x s u s r y dy ds r y dy q x T
i K i N
∈ ∈
     − + −         
∈ = ⊆
∑ ∑∫ ∫ ∫
s.t. 0
0( ) [ , ( ), ( )] [ , ( )] ( ), ( )jj j j j j j j j
i
i i i i i i i idx s f s x s u s ds s x s dz s x t xσ= + =
Consider the coalition as a Super-Agent, the first problem is to optimize its profit, and the 
corresponding solution of ( , , )i is x uϖ should be identified to the solution of a PDE, which can be specified 
in Theorem 3.
Theorem 3    A set of controls 0 **{ ( ) ( , )}i
i i i
t K
K K Ku t t xψ= provides an optimal solution to the stochastic 
control problems 0 0[ ; , ]iK t xΓ , if there exist continuous differentiable function 
0( )
0( , ) :[ , ]
i ji
i j i
mt K
K i KW t x t T R R∈×Π → satisfying the following partial differential equation
0 0
0
0
( ) ( )
, 1
( )
1( , ) ( , ) ( , )
2
max{ [ , , ]ex p ( ) ( , ) [ , , ] [ , , ]}
i i
hi i i i
j i i i
j j i i j j i jji
i i
m
t K t Kh
t K K K Kx x
h
ti t K K K
i i x K i i K ituK j K j K
W t x t x W t x
g t x u r y d y W t x f t x u f t x u
ζ
ζ
ζ =
∈ ∈
− − Ω =
 − +  
∑
∑ ∑∫
with the boundary condition 0
0
( ) ( , ) exp ( ) ( )ji
i j
i
T it K
K it
j K
W T x r y dy q x
∈
 = −  ∑ ∫
.
Where ( , )K Kt xΩ is a matrix with ( , ( ))j ji is x sΩ , for j i ii K N∈ ⊆ , lying in the diagonal and zero 
elsewhere. ( , )
i i
h
K Kt x
ζΩ is the element in row ih and column iζ of ( , )i iK Kt xΩ
The following thing is to distribute the profit between Agents in the coalition, in this sense, two 
conditions, which should be called individual rationality constraint conditions, coalition rationality 
constraint conditions and incentive compatibility constraint conditions, must be considered: 
Condition 1
( ) ( ) \( )* * *
\
( 1)!( )!( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ,
!
j i ji
i i i j
i i
i K iKi i i
N K K i j i
K N i
k n kv x W x W x i N
n
τ τττ τ ττ τ τ
⊆
− −  = − ∈ ∑ ,
0[ , ]t Tτ ∈ and * *i iN Nx X
τ τ∈
where ( )( ) * ( )1 * ( )2 * *( , ) [ ( , ), ( , ),. . . , ( , )]i
i i i i
ni
N N N Nv x v x v x v x
ττ τ τ τ τ τ ττ τ τ τ= , satisfied the basic properties of an 
imputation vector:
(i) ( ) ( )* *
1
( , ) ( , )
i
j i
i
j
n
i N
Ni N
i
v x W xτ ττ ττ τ
=
=∑ , and
(ii) ( ) ( )* *( , ) ( , )j j
i j
i i
N Nv x W x
τ ττ ττ τ≥ , for j ii N∈ ,and 0[ , ]t Tτ ∈
Part (i) of Condition 1 shows that *( , )
iN
v xτ ττ satisfies the property of Pareto optimality throughout the 
game interval. Part (ii) demonstrates that *( , )
iN
v xτ ττ guarantees individual rationality throughout the game 
interval. Set ( )
ji
sB denote the payment received by player j ii N∈ at time 0[ , ]s t T∈ dictated by 
0( ) 0
0( , )j i
t i
Nv t x , we have
Condition 2
*
0( )* *
1 1
( ) [ , , ( , )],
i i
j i
j j i j
j j
n n
i t NS S
i i N i
i i
s g s x s xψ
= =
=∑ ∑B for [ , ]t Tτ∈ and * *i it tN Nx X∈
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So, by dynamical Shapley imputation method, invoke cooperative game theory, we can know, to
maximize the joint coalition's profits, the players would adopt the control vector *0
0
( ) *{ ( , )}i
i i
t N t T
N N t tt xψ = over 
the time interval 0[ , ]t T , and the corresponding optimal state trajectory 0
*{ ( )}
i
T
N t tx t = would result. At time 
0t with state 0i
t
Nx , the players agree that player i's share of profits be
0 00( ) \0 0 0
0 0 0 \
( 1)!( )!( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ,
!
j i ji
i i i j
i i
t i t K it Ki i i
N K K i j i
K N i
k n kv t x W t x W t x i N
n⊆
− −  = − ∈ ∑
Where, set \i jK i is the complement of set { }ji .
In this section, a profit distribution mechanism will be developed to compensate transitory changes so 
that the Shapley value principle in Condition 1 could be maintained throughout the cooperation. First, an 
imputation distribution procedure must be now formulated so that the imputation scheme in Condition 1
can be realized. Let ( )
ji
sB denote the payment received by player j ji N∈ at time 0[ , ]s t T∈ dictated by 
0( ) 0
0( , )j i
t i
Nv t x . In particular
{ }
0 00
0
0 0 0
0
( ) ( ) \( )0 0 0
0 0 0 \
* 0
0
*
0 0
( 1)!( )!( , ) ( , ) ( , )
!
( ) exp[ ( ) ] ( ( )) exp[ ( ) ] ( )
( ) exp[ ( )] ( ( )) exp[ ( )]
j i j
i i i j
i i
t i t K it Ki i i
N K K i
K N i
T s Ti
t i i N Nt t t
i
t i i
k n kv t x W t x W t x
n
E s r y dy ds q x T r y dy x t x
E s r s t ds q x T r T t x
⊆
− −  = − 
= − + − =
= − − + − −
∑
∫ ∫ ∫B
B{ }
0
0
0( )
T
N Nt
t x=∫
for j ii N∈ .
Similar, for j ii N∈ and 0[ , ]t t T∈ , we use
{ }0 0
0
( ) * * *
0 0 0( , ) ( ) exp[ ( )] ( ( )) exp[ ( )] ( )j ji j j i i
Tt i it t
N t i i N Nt
v t x E s r s t ds q x T r T t x t x= − − + − − =∫ B
to denote the present value of Player i's cooperative profit over the time interval [ , ]t T , given that the 
state is * *
i i
t t
N Nx X∈ at time 0[ , ]t t T∈ .
A necessary condition for 0( ) *( , )j
i
t i t
Nv t x to follow Condition 1 is that
0( ) ( )* *
0 0( , ) ( , ) exp[ ( )]j ji i
t i t it t
N Nv t x v t x r t t= − − , for j ii N∈ and [ , ]t Tτ∈ and 
* *
i i
t t
N Nx X∈ .
A candidate of 0( ) *( , )j
i
t i t
Nv t x satisfying the two equations given above has to be found. A natural choice 
is
0 00( ) ( ) \( )* * *
\
( 1)!( )!( , ) ( , ) ( , )
!
j i ji
i i i j
i i
t i t K it Kt t ti i i
N K K i
K N i
k n kv t x W t x W t x
n⊆
− −  = − ∑ , for 
* *
i i
t t
N Nx X∈
Theorem 4 A payment of transitory compensation to player j ii N∈ at time 0[ , ]t Tτ ∈ equaling
{
( )* *
( ) \( ) * *
( ) \( ) ( )* * * *
\
*
( 1)!( )!( ) ( , ) ( , )
!
( , ) ( , ) , , ( , )
1 ( , )
2
i ji
j i i
i i
i ji i i
i i j i j iN Ni i
i i
i t
K iKi i i
i t K t t K t
K N i
K iK N N
K t K i t N i Nx x
h
K x
k n k W t x W t x
n
W t x W t x f x x
x W
τ τ
ττ τ τ
τ τ
ττ ττ τ τ τ
τ τ
ζ
τ
τ
τ ψ τ
τ
= =
⊆
= =
− −   = − −   
     + − +        
Ω
∑B
( ) \( ) * * *
\
, 1 , 1
1( , ) ( , ) ( , )
2
i i
i ji i i
h hi i i ii jt t t
i i i i
n n
K iK h
t t K i t tx x x
h h
t x x W t xζ ζ
ττ ζ
τ τ τ
ζ ζ
τ= =
= =
   − Ω    
∑ ∑
when * *( )
i i iN N N
x x Xτ ττ = ∈ will lead to the realization of the Condition 1.
Theorem 5    A payment of transitory compensation to player j ii N∈ at time 0[ , ]t Tτ ∈ leading to the 
realization of the Condition 1 can be expressed as:
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{
*
*
( ) \( ) * *
( ) ( )* * *
( ) \ * *
\
( 1)!( )!( ) ( , ) ( , )
!
( , ) , , ( , )
( , ) , ,
i ji
j i i
i i
i i i
i i j ii j
j i
i j i
i j iih
K iKi i i
i t K t t K t
K N i
K N N
K t i N i Nx
i K
K i N
K i t h Nx
k n k W t x W t x
n
W t x f x x
W x f x
τ
τ
ττ τ τ
τ τ
τ ττ τ τ
τ
τ τ τ
τ
τ
τ ψ τ
τ τ ψ
= =
⊆
=
∈
=
− −   = − −   
   +    
 −   
∑
∑
B
( ) *
\
( ) \( )* * * *
\
, 1 , 1
( , )
1 1( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )
2 2
i
h i
h i j
i i
i ji i i i i
h hi i i ii i jt t t t
i i i i
N
i N
i K i
n n
K ih K h
K t t K i t tx x x x
h h
x
x W t x x W t xζ ζ
τ τ
τζ τ ζ
τ τ τ τ
ζ ζ
τ
τ τ
∈
= =
= =
  + 
   Ω − Ω    
∑
∑ ∑
when * *( )
i i iN N N
x x Xτ ττ = ∈
Noted please, the vector ( )i τB serves as a form equilibrating transitory compensation that guarantees 
the realization of the Shapley value imputation throughout the game horizon. Note that the instantaneous 
profit ( )
ji
τB offered to Player ij τat time is conditional upon the current state *Nx
τ and current time τ .
One can elect to express ( )
ji
τB as *( , )
j ii N
xττB . Hence an instantaneous payment *( , )
j ii N
xττB to player 
j ii N∈ yields a dynamically stable solution to the joint coalition.
3.2. Non-Cooperative stochastic differential game between Local-Worlds
When we abstract every Local-World to a Super-Agent, the interactions between Super-Agents can be 
defined to non-cooperative stochastic differential game Γ , as analyzed above. In this sense, we construct 
this non-cooperative stochastic differential game model:
{ }0
0 0 0
[ , ( ), ( )]exp ( ) exp ( ) ( ( ))
T s Ti i
t i i it t t
E g s x s u s r y dy ds r y dy q x T   − + −      ∫ ∫ ∫
, i N∈
s.t. 00( ) [ , ( ), ( )] [ , ( )] ( ), ( )
i
i i i i i i i idx s f s x s u s ds s x s dz s x t xσ= + =
The optimal strategy for each Super-agent is called Nash equilibrium solution, and can be transferred 
to the solution of corresponding PDF, shown as Theorem 6.
Theorem 6    An n-tuple of feedback strategies *{ ( , ) , }ii t x U i Nφ ∈ ∈ provides a Nash equilibrium
solution to the game Γ between Super-Agents, if there exist suitably smooth functions 
0:[ , ] ,
i mV t T R R i N× → ∈ , satisfying the following semilinear parabolic partial differential equation
, 1
* * * * *
1 2 1 1
* * * * *
1 2 1 1
1( , ) ( , ) ( , )
2
max{ [ , , ( , ), ( , ),..., ( , ), ( ), ( , ),..., ( , )]
( , ) [ , , ( , ), ( , ),..., ( , ), ( ), ( , ),..., ( , )]}
h
i
m
i h
t x x
h
i
i i i nu
x i i i n
V t x t x V t x
g t x t x t x t x u t t x t x
V t x f t x t x t x t x u t t x t x
ζ
ζ
ζ
φ φ φ φ φ
φ φ φ φ φ
=
− +
− +
− − Ω
=
+
∑
, and
( , ) ( )W T x q x=
So far, the profits of Agents and Agent in a certain Local-World is gotten, the next work is to give the 
real profit for every Agent in arbitrary Local-Worlds, which will be specified in the next section.
4. Optimal strategy of each agent
Mentioned above, one of the most important thing is to decide the certain equivalency between the 
Nash equilibrium solution ( , , )V s x u of ( , , )s x uΓ and the optimal solution of ( , , )W s x u , ( , , )s x uϖ . So it 
will be resolved in this sub-section.
Noted that, there are some obvious distinction of the state space between the non-cooperative game 
( , , )s x uΓ and optimal problem ( , , )s x uϖ , the former is the state of the Super-Agent, among different 
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Local-Worlds, and the latter is the one of Agent, among a same Local-World. However, invoke the 
Definition 2.2.1 and the proof of Theorem 2.5.1 drawn by David W. K. Yeung and Leon A. Petrosyan 
(2006), it is easy to know that the Nash optimal solution of each Super-Agent is independent to the other’s
if the other Super-Agents’ profits are maximized, as specified in Theorem 6 in this paper. So, the strong 
connection between ( , , )V s x u and ( , , )W s x u must be existed. According to the variation theory, the 
solution of the game models mentioned above can be described as some certain non-linear operator, to 
specify this in detail, the result of Guanyan CHEN (2009) should be introduced in this paper.
Lemma 1 Suppose that ( , )X d is a complete space, ( , )Y C is the Hausdroff order topological vector 
space, where 0 intc C∈ . Set :f X Y→ is the mapping with vectors and C− is lower bounded. Set 0ε∀ >
and every x X∈ , set
0{ : ( ) ( ) ( , ) 0}Cy X f y f x d x y cε∈ − + ≤
is closed. Then for every 0x X∈ such that 
0
0( ) min( ( ))
c
f x f X
ε
∈ , and there exists point x Xε ∈ such that
1) 0( ) ( )Cf x f xε ≤ ;
2) 0( , )d x x ε≤ ;
3) 
0 0( ) min( ( ))c cCf x f Xεε ε∈
;
where 
0
0( ) ( ) ( , ) ,
c
f x f x d x x c x Xεε ε= + ∀ ∈ , 0min( )c Aε
is the ε − effective point of set A , min( )
c
A is the 
effective point of set A .
Because the derivative, the variation theory can be used, which makes there must be certain strong 
connection between ( , , )V s x u and ( , , )W s x u , and this operator can be denoted by ( , , )s x uϑ , so, 
( , , ) ( , , ) ( , , ) ( ( , , ))V s x u s x u W s x u o s x uϑ= +  . i.e., we can construct a function 
( , , ) ( , , , ( , , ) / ( , , ))s x u s x u V s x u W s x uϑ ϕ= to denote the relation between them. By integrating  Theorem 3, 
Theorem 6 and Lemma 1, we have:
Theorem 7 There must be a function ( )xϕ such that ( , , ) ( ( , , ))V s x u W s x uϕ=
1) 
0( , ) exp[ ( )]t x r t t xϕ = − − if game Γ is infinite-horizon feedback game;
2)
0( , ) (exp[ [ ]] )
qt x o r t t xϕ = − − , and 0 1q< < , if game Γ is feedback game.
Proof of Theorem 1 and Theorem 2.
Next we can make a conclusion that the Pareto optimal solution of agents’ profits in this system rely on 
Theorem 7, Theorem 4 and Theorem 5 by replacing the corresponding profit distributed by ϕ . In this 
sense, we can know the imputation for these profits in this Local-World can be described as
0
00
( ) *
( ) \( ) * *
0 0 \
( , )
( 1)!( )! exp[ ( )] ( , ) exp[ ( )] ( , )
!
j
i
i ji
i i j
i i
t i t
N
t K it K t q t qi i i
K K i
K N i
v t x
k n k r s t W t x r s t W t x
n⊆
=
− −  − − − ∑
, for * *
i i
t t
N Nx X∈ .
Replace this result into Theorem 4 and Theorem 5, and reconsider the Hypotheses introduced above, 
Theorem 1 and 2 are proven.                                                                                                                        ■
5. Conclusion
The system can be separated into several different Local-Worlds, and each Local-World can be called 
Super-Agent, and each element in arbitrary Local-World is called Agent. Based on this, suppose that the 
interaction between Agents is defined to the cooperative stochastic different game by considering the 
Local-world synchronized and the Local-World coordinated, and suppose that the interaction between 
Agents is defined to the non-cooperative stochastic differential game. Whatever kinds of behaviors are 
defined, the player’s random and creative behaviors are considered by introducing the stochastic games 
into this system.
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Two different interactions are introduced to different cases to satisfy the system’s rationality. However, 
there exists some degree of distinction as far as the Super-Agent’s profit obtained between these two 
different cases. So, the equivalency coupled is given in Theorem 7. Based on this, each Super-Agent’s
profit is determined. Then, a profit imputation mechanism by dynamic Shapley technique between Agents 
is constructed, shown in Theorem 1. For keeping the profit distributed rationally, the corresponding
transitory compensatory mechanism to the profit distributed is constructed to make every agent satisfied, 
as specified in Theorem 2.
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